This paper studied the possibility and challenge of achieving sustainable rural finance by the Dayak Peoples ,
INTRODUCTION
During the 1960s and 1970s in Southeast Asian developing countries, many financial institutions were established (or reorganized) as rural financial institutions, and artificial and political funds were injected to introduce high-yield seedlings, fer tilizer, agrochemicals, and ir rigation. This was, in other words, the Green Revolution. Even though this financial support had a cer tain positive impact on food production, the low repayment rates, high dependence on outside funds, and participation limited to large and wealthy farmers were problems (Izumida 2003) . Such traditional supply-led r ural finance was categorized as farm finance (FF) (Egaitsu 1988) . These experiences led to a new paradigm: the rural financial market (RFM) approach, which was related to the structural adjustment policies and financial liberalization of the early 1980s. This approach was advocated by the Department of Agricultural Economics and Rural Sociology at Ohio State University, U.S.A (Adams and Graham 1981) . The confidence in the competitive market mechanism, which was based on the neoclassical economics viewpoint, characterized the concept behind the RFM approach (Egaitsu 1988) . This approach considers establishing rural financial markets to be important, and holds that the key factors for success a r e t h e i n t e r r e l a t i o n s a m o n g s a v i n g , f i n a n c i a l intermediation efficiency, and repayment rates, while the FF point of view holds that the establishment of lending institutions to channel external funds into agriculture is of the utmost importance (Egaitsu 1988 , Izumida 2003 .
In general, however, rural financial markets in many developing countries have not matured because of high law-enforcement costs and information asymmetry (Hoff and Stiglitz 1990) . In addition, rural finance generally targets small farmers and small enterprises, which are usually low-income households. This leads to heavy transaction costs 1) . Commercial financial institutions traditionally avoided ser ving poor people. Thus, the success of rural finance or microfinance 2) (MF), which is spreading worldwide as a means of poverty alleviation, is evaluated according to outreach for targets and the self-sustainability of MFIs (Yaron 1994) . The former evaluates whether financial ser vices reach targets (usually poor people and small enterprises), while the latter evaluates whether financial institution management is self-sustaining. These two criteria usually have a tradeof f relationship. Many MFIs that put priority on outreach receive subsidies (Morduch 1999 (Morduch , pp. 1587 (Morduch -1588 . This includes the FF approach. On the other hand, MFIs that put priority on self-sustainability serve the richest of the poor, or those who are above the poverty line (Morduch 1999 (Morduch , pp. 1576 (Morduch -1578 . Here is where we find the RFM approach.
In Indonesia, Bank Rakyat Indonesia (BRI) has operated as the principal rural financial institution. In the 1970s BIMAS (Bimbingan Massal), a large governmentsubsidized agricultural credit program for rice cultivation, failed in terms of financial sustainability because of low repayment rates, even though it succeeded in eliciting rice production growth. Thus in the 1980s BRI switched from the FF approach to the RFM approach 3) and became one of the most successful MFIs (Robinson, 2002) . On the other hand, financial cooperatives such as KUD (Koperasi Unit Desa) and KSP (Koperasi Simpan Pinjam) were developed as typical FF-type cooperatives in Indonesia. In the 1970s KUD was granted a monopoly status in r ural areas, thus formally disallowing the establishment of independent cooperatives. KUD was managed by government employees without effective internal control, and therefore KUD became a major fund appropriation catchment for local of ficials and richer far mers. In the 1980s and 1990s, the widespread corruption and high losses incurred due to subsidized credit programs had become a major issue of public debate (Detlev 2001) . Unfortunately, however, many lumbung desas (village rice banks) 7) failed because of embezzlement by committee members (usually the village head and other village committee members). For that reason the colonial government strengthened supervision and gave up trying to establish cooperative-based financial institutions (Fruin 1999 (Fruin [1933 ) 8) . After Indonesia gained independence via
The credit union (CU)
Orde Lama (1957 Lama ( -1966 and Orde Baru (1967 Baru ( -1998 , the CU system was used to organize financial cooperatives that had been instr umentalized for channeling farm inputs and credit by the government. Then the CU idea led to FF-type financial cooperatives, which had already departed from the original CU principle and philosophy.
In this paper CU is defined as the Schulze and Raiffesen 
METHODS

Analytical framework
Generally the success of rural financial institutions is measured by self-sustainability and outreach (Yaron 1994) . Izumida (2003) said that self-sustainability is assessed by the level of 1) savings mobilization rate, 2) financial intermediary efficiency, and 3) repayment rate (Izumida 2003) . 1) and 3) show the sustainability of the financial system and 2) shows the cost-performance of financial institutions for financial intermediation. Rural financial institutions can operate self-sustainably if these three criteria are maintained at good levels. This paper uses these criteria to evaluate the performance of CUPU. Outreach is regarded as a contribution to a certain social goal. This paper divides the outreach of CUPU into width of outreach and depth of outreach. Width of outreach comprises total number of members, assets, savings, and outstanding loans, and it is evaluated by annual financial reports. Depth of outreach means the quality of ser vice, such as how far CUPU ser vice penetrates targets. It is analyzed with field survey results.
Finally, factors such as norms, trust, and institutions, which are shared as common bonds and affect CUPU , s performance, are evaluated using the data from informal and structured inter views with CUPU employees and kolektors. This paper defines common bond as a n e t w o r k o f e t h n i c i t y, r e l i g i o n , o c c u p a t i o n , a n d community 12)
. . . THTA is a major capital source for CUPU because those savings are usually not withdrawn. CUPU pr omotes THTA so that people will pr epar e for retirement. CUPU has some features to promote savings: 2) Progressive loans: CUPU offers progressive loans for saving. Members bor row money but cannot withdraw it, and instead put it in THTA accounts.
Research site
Members make monthly loan payments, and after paying of f the loan they can withdraw the money.
CUPU , s strategy is to recommend that new members take out pr ogr essive loans, which pr ovides experience in savings and loan payments, while also promoting savings and getting information about members , repayment ability. This helps CUPU employees later when they decide on making ordinary loans.
3) Financial education: New members must take a twoday course in financial education. CUPU tells them about CUPU financial ser vices and how to manage family finances. 
4)
1) Flexible interest rate:
The interest rate is 2% of the month-end principal. Thus the more of the principal that has been repaid, the lower the interest. If a borrower successfully repays on schedule, the interest is only 12% to 13% annually, but if repayment is late, the maximum interest rate is 24% annually.
2) When 75% of a loan is repaid, members can borrow again. The remaining loan is integrated into the new loan.
3) Consultation and screening by kolektors: If members want to apply for loans, they must consult with kolektors before going to the CUPU. Although credit officers decide on loan disbursement, they use information from kolektors. Thus of ficers usually agree with kolektors.
4)
Members could borrow more than twice the amount of their savings before the local economic crisis in the Middle-Upper Mahakam region. Now it is difficult to bor row without collateral because of the high delinquency rate. Table 2 shows the financial analysis result.
Self-sustainability
Savings mobilization
Deposits to total assets has been maintained at 80-90% income sources such as rubber and wage labor, so that they were not affected by illegal logging restrictions and commercial logging industry decline. As a result, CUPU profitability is maintained in the New Participation region.
Width of outreach
As of 2010 CUPU had expanded its financial services to 4,240 members; it had total assets of 25 billion Rp, total volunteer savings 19.6 billion Rp, and outstanding loans 18.6 billion Rp ( Table 2) . CUPU was a little smaller than the median value of world CU as of 2008 22) . Further details of transactions between members and CUPU are given in the next section, Depth of Outreach. Many families were forced to buy rice. The rates for vegetables, fish, and meat were 63%, 58%, and 67%, respectively. Additionally, local people can use timber to On the whole, many people in Middle-Upper Saving and borrowing Mahakam region, the repayment rate decreased d r a s t i c a l l y a n d t h e s e l f -s u s t a i n a b i l i t y o f C U P U encountered difficulty. On the whole it could be said that the depth of outreach was maintained relatively well until 2005, while the width of outreach is still limited because of the distrust toward unhealthy financial cooperatives of the past.
Depth of outreach
Economic condition of sample households
Changes in financial access
Function of common bonds
In this section, we try to consider the effect of common bonds on CUPU , s performance. This paper divides CU common bonds into two dimensions, multi-level ethnic identity and local networks in each region. 
Multi-level ethnic identity
Local networks
As seen already, CUPU , s ef ficiency is ver y high as a result of low operating expenses and low personnel expenses ( Table 2) In addition to collecting savings and loan payments, a major common bond function is solving the problem of information asymmetr y. Table 11 and Table 12 Nine employees said, I want to continue working at Table 11 . The perceptions of employees (N=10).
Questiuon Answers Numbers
1)
Can you get information of members? I can get information of members. 8
Do you want to continue work in CUPU? I want to continue I am considering whether to quit CUPU or not
What is the enjoyable and proud point in CUPU work?
I can make many friends throuh CUPU. 9
I can support members throug my work. 6 I can gain knowlage, skills, and experience. 
10
What is the difficulty in CUPU work?
Balancing CUPU work with family obligations. 3
Loan delinquency and collecting them. 2
Writing reports 2
Getting help from coworkers to go places. 2
Balansing CUPU work and NGO work 1
My education background 1
Working alone in the office. force members to pay. This is a limitation of CUPU when using common bonds.
The factors affecting the performance of CUPU Thus CUPU too could help members generate income by means of production loans for agriculture and other income-generating activities.
2) Strengthening the cross-subsidizing str ucture for managing risk: Because the majority of CUPU members are from the Middle-Upper Mahakam region, the cross-subsidizing structure must be strengthened.
To disperse risk, CUPU must get new wealthier or middle-class members from other regions where the economic situation is good. 2) Ever since Grameen Bank succeeded in providing credit to poor people who could not access the usual banks with high repayment rates, microcredit has attracted attention as a means of alleviating poverty. In 2007, more than 100 million of the world , s poorest families received microloans (Sam 2009 ). According to Armendariz and Morduch (2005) , microcredit was coined initially to refer to institutions like Grameen Bank, which focused on getting loans to the very poor.
The focus was explicitly on pover ty reduction and social change, and the key players were NGOs. The push to microfinance came with recognition that households can benefit from access to financial services that are more broadly defined (at first the focus was m a i n l y o n s a v i n g ) , a n d n o t j u s t c r e d i t f o r microenterprises. With the change in language has come a change in orientation, toward less-poor h o u s e h o l d s a n d t o w a r d t h e e s t a b l i s h m e n t o f commercially oriented, fully regulated financial entities (Armendariz and Morduch 2005) . However, in this study microfinance is defined as small loans, savings, and insurance for poor or low-income households, including small entrepreneurs and small farmers. (Takeuchi and Ikuta 1976 pp. 30-41; Muraoka 1997, pp. 131-144) . On the other hand, FF type cooperatives accept donation, ser ve to non members and there is no such unlimited joint liabilities . Selfh e l p p r i n c i p l e i s n o t m a i n t a i n e d i n F F t y p e cooperatives. 18) Some employees and kolektors who misappropriated CUPU money were dismissed for embezzlement.
19) Simpaga accounted for 5.9%, Tubun for 0.87%, and ABG Save for 2.1% of total savings as of 2010.
Simpaga , s annual interest rate was 5%, that of Tubun was 7% for three months, 9% for six months, and 11%
for 12 months, and that of ABG Save was 7%, as of 2007.
20)
In a month when a member withdraws share savings, the interest rate decreases by 3% (but only for that month). In a month when a member does not deposit savings, the interest rate decreases by 9%.
21) Accor ding to CUPU , s financial r epor t, their operational self-sustainability was 107% as of 2007.
However, because CUPU did not calculate its loan loss reser ve, the author calculated it using the WOCCU Peals standard (The allowance for loan losses/ delinquency > 12 months is 100%, and that for loan losses/delinquency of 1-12 months is 35%) and got the value of 62.5%. Nevertheless, the actual amount of written-off delinquent loans is unknown.
22)
The world median number of depositors per CU was 3,340; also in terms of world median values, total assets had reached US$3,581,211, total savings were US$1,418,227, and outstanding loans were US$ Fukuyama (2000) wrote, Group solidarity in human communities is often purchased at the price of hostility toward out-group members. There appears to be a natural human proclivity for dividing the world into friends and enemies that is the basis of all politics.
24)
25)
Their ages are 25 to 38, with the average age being 30.9. Eight are women and two are men. Two have graduated from universities, two from high school, seven from colleges, and one has only an elementary school education.
26)
Their average age is 38.1. In terms of education, seven graduated from elementar y school, six from junior high school, six from high school, three from college, and one did not graduate from any institution.
By occupation, 15 are farmers, 11 are housewives, five are teachers, thr ee ar e shopkeepers, two ar e ministers, one is a carpenter, one is a healthcare provider, and one is employed by a company.
27) Fifteen are farmers, 11 are housewives, five are teachers, three are shopkeepers, two are ministers, one is a carpenter, one is a pharmacist, and one is employed by a company.
28)
For example when members visit a kolektor , s home, meet a kolektor on the road in a village, or meet a kolektor at church.
